Mexico has proven it can assemble products with the same precision as the world’s most advanced factories. But it hasn’t proven it can design them. The gap between manufacturing and what has been called “mind-making”—between manufacturing and generating its own innovation—silently permeates the entire national economic model . “We are still a maquiladora country, and sadly, we will probably remain that way,” warned Samuel Peña during the Strategic Breakfast “USMCA: What’s next for Mexico in the Trump era?”, organized by GT+logistics and GT+plastics .
His diagnosis isn’t based on industrial nostalgia or pessimism: it’s based on data and recent history. For more than three decades, Mexico has strived to integrate into the global economy as a manufacturing platform, particularly for the United States market. Since joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 and signing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992—and its subsequent launch in 1994—the country has woven a network of 13 trade agreements with 51 countries, which in theory were supposed to diversify its economic ties. In practice, however, 86% of foreign trade remains concentrated in the United States. This figure reveals that liberalization has not translated into true diversification, but rather a deepening of dependence .
Structural dependence and unfavorable exchange rate policy
The concentration of trade in a single partner is no small matter: it defines the country’s structural vulnerability. Exports represent around 30% of the Gross Domestic Product—some $450 billion—but are dominated by foreign corporations such as Ford , Volkswagen , Stellantis , LG, and Whirlpool , among others. They generate the majority of foreign sales and, therefore, repatriate profits to their parent companies in Detroit, Seoul, Munich, or Tokyo. Mexico operates as an efficient production platform, but with little control over technology, intellectual property, or the final destination of the generated value . Hence, the transition to mindfacturing is more than an aspirational rhetoric: it is a matter of economic sovereignty and real maneuverability in the face of international fluctuations.
This dependence becomes even more evident when observing the behavior of exchange rate policy. Peña Nieto was blunt in pointing out that maintaining an artificially strong peso has been a strategic error. “Having a cheap dollar is not synonymous with economic strength. It is affecting us profoundly,” he stated . With an appreciated exchange rate, Mexican exports lose competitiveness and domestic inputs become more expensive compared to imported ones. China and Korea have followed the opposite path: they have maintained weak currencies to boost their domestic industries and favor their exports, a policy that Mexico has not adopted despite the fact that a third of its economy directly depends on them. Peña Nieto even suggested that a gradual slide toward levels of 21 to 24 pesos per dollar would strengthen the national export industry without generating an inflationary crisis, as long as it was accompanied by productive measures.
The logic is clear: if Mexico wants to transition toward mind-manufacturing, it needs not only talent and technology, but also macroeconomic conditions that don’t reward imports and penalize local production . Today, the opposite is true. With a strong peso and an industrial base dependent on imported inputs, it’s cheaper to import components from abroad than to develop them domestically. This fuels a vicious cycle in which maquila thrives, but innovation stagnates.
Internal oligopolies and external pressure: the trade storm
Added to this macroeconomic environment is an internal structure that, far from fostering competition and innovation, tends to concentrate power and make strategic inputs more expensive.
This distortion of domestic prices not only affects large transnational corporations; it even more severely limits small and medium-sized enterprises that could integrate as higher-value-added suppliers into production chains. Instead of encouraging the development of new domestic technological capabilities, the oligopolistic environment forces companies to continue relying on imported components and to operate with narrow margins that inhibit investment in innovation. Once again, mindfacture is relegated to the background by a set of structural conditions that make it practically unviable .
In this context, the relationship with China takes on a strategic importance that cannot be ignored. Mexico maintains a nine-to-one trade deficit with that country: for every dollar exported—mostly food and copper—it imports nine dollars in manufactured goods . For years, this dynamic remained under the radar thanks to preferential access to the US market through NAFTA and later the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). However, the landscape is changing rapidly. With the new Donald Trump administration, tariff policies against China have tightened, and Washington has made it clear that it will demand that Mexico close the “back doors” that allow Chinese companies to enter the North American market from Mexican territory.
Peña anticipated that the 2026 revision of the USMCA will be one of the most pressured moments for Mexican trade policy in decades. The most likely scenario, he said, is the imposition of new controls, tariffs, and regulations that will limit the flexibility with which Mexico has operated until now. “We can forget about a free trade agreement per se ,” he warned , recalling that NAFTA went through gradual stages of tariff reduction between 1994 and 2009. This gradual process could be repeated, but in reverse: from an open regime to a more restrictive one, at a time when Mexico’s industrial structure is not prepared to absorb a shock of that magnitude without first strengthening its technological and productive base.
Nearshoring and alliances: conditional opportunity
The scenario of tariff pressure and adjustments to the rules of the trade game also coincides with a silent transformation in foreign investment flows. According to Samuel Peña, the arrival of new companies to Mexico has practically stopped. Most of the capital currently counted as foreign direct investment corresponds to reinvestment of profits or expansions of established operations . “There are no new companies arriving. They are waiting to see what happens with the USMCA,” he explained.
This strategic pause is not a sign of disinterest, but rather of caution. Multinational companies are carefully evaluating renegotiation scenarios, domestic economic policy signals, and logistics and energy conditions before committing fresh capital. Peña projected that this trend could continue until 2027, when there is greater clarity regarding the new trade framework. In other words, Mexico is going through a ” wait and see ” period, which could become an opportunity if it manages to articulate a coherent strategy to attract and retain quality investment.
In this context, the nearshoring phenomenon takes on a critical dimension. In theory, the relocation of production chains to North America represents a historic opportunity for Mexico. Its geographic proximity, network of trade agreements, and manufacturing base make it a natural candidate to absorb new production lines. However, as Peña Nieto warned, competing for these investments will not be easy. “We can’t compete with a state like Texas. It’s the eighth-largest economy in the world for a reason,” he noted .
The difference lies in the structural conditions: Texas has access to ample financing, a robust logistics infrastructure, and a clear regulatory framework. Mexico, on the other hand, operates with a concentrated financial system—72 banks, five of which account for 75% of the market—a limited logistics network, and high costs in strategic sectors such as energy and steel . These limitations mean that, even with the appeal of nearshoring , many companies prefer to wait or set up shop directly in the United States, taking advantage of tax incentives and legal certainty.
But this waiting period can also work in Mexico’s favor if used wisely. Peña emphasized that the gradual closure of the “back doors” for Chinese imports does not necessarily mean the end of the economic relationship with Asia . On the contrary, it could open a different era, based on strategic alliances, joint ventures , or acquisitions between Chinese and Mexican companies to maintain access to the North American market under new rules. This shift would require industrial vision and active public policy to facilitate technological and financial partnerships that currently do not exist on the necessary scale.
In essence, the message is clear: if Mexico doesn’t develop its own technological and innovation capabilities, nearshoring risks becoming a new wave of maquila, without substantial improvements in local value-added or strategic autonomy. Mindfacturing once again emerges as the guiding principle of any strategy that aims to go beyond simply being the workshop of North America.
Infrastructure, financing and taxation: the pending foundations
Any strategy to make the leap toward mind-manufacturing and capitalize on nearshoring must address, without hesitation, the structural backlog in infrastructure and energy . Peña recalled that during the last six-year term, “not a single kilometer of electrical transmission lines” was built, which has created bottlenecks for industrial development. Building an industrial park of just 50 hectares can entail investments exceeding 200 million pesos in electrical infrastructure alone. Unlike the United States, where there are more than 30 transmission companies competing for bids, Mexico requires the financing and construction of the necessary infrastructure, which discourages new developments.
Logistics is also no exception to this logic of lag. Major ports, such as Manzanillo and Lázaro Cárdenas, are operating at the limit of their capacity. The highway network lacks efficient cross-country corridors connecting the Gulf of Mexico with the Pacific, and in many stretches, insecurity is an additional deterrent. “If you want to send a truck from Matamoros to Tijuana, there’s no way. You have to cross via the American highway,” Peña explained. This precarious logistics contrasts with Mexico’s aspirations to position itself as an advanced manufacturing hub integrated into global chains; without modern and reliable infrastructure, geographical advantages quickly fade.
Adding to this weakness is a financial and fiscal structure that concentrates power and restricts access to productive credit. Of the more than three million registered businesses in the country, barely 0.1% contribute 46% of tax revenue . Small and medium-sized enterprises, which should be the protagonists of a strategy of innovation and productive linkages, operate with limited access to financing and uninspiring tax burdens. Peña even suggested revising the tax structure to increase VAT and reduce income tax, thereby incentivizing the circulation of money in the productive economy and not directly penalizing value creation. At the same time, a highly concentrated banking system limits credit and raises rates for those outside large conglomerates, deepening the gap between large multinationals and the national productive fabric.
Looking at the whole picture – trade dependence on the United States, a tight exchange rate policy, internal oligopolies, a structural deficit with China, a pause in foreign investment, infrastructure lags, and a concentrated financial system – a clear pattern emerges: Mexico has built a robust manufacturing platform, but without the technological, institutional, and logistical foundation that would allow it to sustain a qualitative leap toward mindfacturing .
For Samuel Peña, the revision of the USMCA and the tightening of US trade policy should not be understood solely as threats, but as an inevitable catalyst for redefining the country’s industrial strategy. “Closing the door to China doesn’t mean isolating ourselves, but rather generating strategic partnerships,” he emphasized . In other words, the window of opportunity exists, but it won’t remain open indefinitely.
Mexico is at a crossroads. It can continue to strengthen its role as a maquiladora platform, passively adapting to new trade rules, or it can use this situation to reconfigure its integration into global value chains, investing in innovation, strengthening its local suppliers, improving its infrastructure, and creating macroeconomic conditions that reward domestic production. This isn’t about abandoning manufacturing—one of the pillars of its economy—but rather complementing it with technological capabilities, talent, and public policies that allow it to make the leap it has been postponing for decades.
Mindfacturing isn’t a rhetorical slogan: it’s the difference between remaining in a subordinate position or becoming an actor with greater strategic autonomy in an increasingly competitive and less predictable global environment. The clock has already started ticking, and the 2026 revision of the USMCA will mark one of the clearest deadlines for determining which way the balance is tipping .
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